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Abstract 
The paper will trace the innovations in doing business achieved by the Fortex Group, which were reliant on a reworking 
of the forms of work and industrial relations typical to the meat industry. The innovations used by F ortex included: I) the 
integration of niche marketing and new forms of processing; 2) the use of shift work and the move to the year round 
employment ofmeatworkers; 3) the adoption ofTQM and teamwork involving the meatworkers ' union; and 4) the attempt 
at new contracts with its farmer-suppliers, in which the union played an important part. The paper will go on to account 
for why these significant developments failed to secure the firm. In this regard it will be argued that the study of work and 
industrial relations requires an appreciation of not just the sites where deals between management and labour are produced 
but of the embeddedness of these deals within the networks of the industry. The causes of the failure ofF ortex are identified 
as: 1) the erosion of its competitive edge; 2) the inability to subordinate its farmer-suppliers; and 3) the vulnerability of the 
firm in competition for stock. Fortex can be said to havefronted an effort to rework the networks of the meat industry and 
although the firm obtained the close support of the meatworkers ' union in its plants it was nevertheless undone by an 
alignment of interests outside the fi rm. 
At the Labour Employment and Work Conference in 1992 I 
argued that the meat industry constituted a peculiar ' world of 
production' (Salais and Storper, 1992) in which farmers 
enjoyed structural advantages at the expense of processing 
firms (Curtis , 1992). This paper will extend some aspects of 
my earlier report. In it I will trace how one processing firm, 
the Fortex Group, used innovation in work and industrial 
relations and did so as part of an effort to refashion the 
networks of the industry (Grabner, 1993). 
This effort by Fortex proved a failure. Fortex was liquidated 
1994. As far as this fai lure is concerned I will argue that 
farmers played a central role in the demise of Fortex. In 
short, the innovation at Fortex was stymied by interests 
outside the firm, of which farmers (acting as suppliers of 
stock) were the most important. 
I suggest that the failure of Fortex is illuminating for two 
sorts of reasons. The first reason is that as an account of 
business failure attention is focused on the limits to innova-
tion. The bulk of this paper will explore some of the forms 
of innovation atFortex. This was called 'theFortex Way' by 
the managers and unionists at the firm. It should be reiter-
ated that for a number of years the Fortex Way looked like 
a way forward for the meat industry (Perry , Davidson and 
Hill , 1995). Consequently the question posed by this paper 
becomes: Why did Fortex fail? Unquestionably its failure 
was not for a lack of audacity and experimentation. 
Th is brings me to the second reason why an account of 
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Fortex might be useful. That is, it makes an explanation in 
terms of the networks ofthe industry (Portz, 1991). In this 
sense the firm is made both central and problematic to the 
account. I will try and trace some of the connections 
involved between the ' inside' and the 'outside' of the firm 
(Edwards, 1986). In this regard I will suggest that 'outside' 
factors dominated and that the very successes secured ' in-
side • Fortex, in the areas of work and industrial relations 
made it extremely vulnerable to the supply decisions of 
farmers (Font, 1990). 
Because of the high profile character o f the firm and its 
eventual bankruptcy it would be all to easy to emphasise the 
rhetoric, hype and irony associated with the innovation at 
Fortex. However the main thrust of this paper is to situate 
and treat seriously, firstly, an effort to refashion work and 
industrial relations and, secondly, an effort to refashion the 
networks of the meat industry. 
The integration of further processing and niche 
marketing 
In 1990 Graeme Thompson, founder and managing director, 
boasted that Fortex had achieved what sociologists would 
identify as a form of 'bespoke manufacture' (Pi ore and 
Sabel, 1984). He claimed: 
The objective is that by the time the animal is slaugh-
tered, it has already been sold and its contribution to the 
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company is known. The goal of achieving higher mar-
gins from added-value further processing has enhanced 
profitability. (Thompson, 1990).1 
This version of Pi ore and Sa bel's ideal of flexible speciali-
sation was based on the fusion of further processing (in the 
form of hot boning) and of niche marketing. Together they 
were supposed to result in added-value and enhanced prof-
its. These technical terms require some clarification. 
Further processing is the commonly used terminology for 
the cutting of carcases to produce portions of meat suitable 
for retail markets. Hot boning is the most sophisticated and 
newest form of further processing. It entails the cutting of 
carcases that are chilled rather than frozen. Such cutting may 
result in the transformation of a lamb carcass into a variety 
of consumer ready and even meal-sized portions. In this 
production scenario, that is the extended 'dis-assembly' of 
stock, niche marketing constitutes the sale of a multitude of 
precisely customised cuts of meat. In the case ofFortex this 
meant trying to make contracts with supermarkets, hotels 
and restaurants to supply them with exactly specified por-
tions of meat. 
Thompson's boast leads us to the organisation of work and 
industrial relations at Fortex. The stand-out feature of which 
were the implementation of shift work and a guarantee of 
year-round employment. 
Shift work and a guarantee of year-round em-
ployment 
It is important to note that while Fortex was celebrated for 
forms of innovation technological advancement was not one 
of them. While the Fortex plants at Seafield (built in 1985) 
and at Silverstream (built in 1990) used the best of available 
technology, their layout were not much different to those 
used in other modem plants. Indeed one senior manager at 
Fortex described the Seafield plant as being 'built on the 
cheap.' Rather than rely on new forms of technology the 
most interesting features of the Fortex Way were the result 
of experiments in arranging, rewarding and supervising 
work. 
Furthermore, the Fortex Way did not emerge fully formed. 
Like all other organisations, Fortex was unable to escape its 
past. In this sense the decision made by Thompson and 
company to initially build only a small-scale plant at Seafield 
created a material legacy (or constraint) which shaped all 
subsequent innovation at Fortex. 
Also it must be acknowledged (with the benefit of hindsight) 
that Fortex had fantastic PR. Hence, a number of managerial 
initiatives which might otherwise have received a sceptical 
response were heralded by commentators as foreshadowing 
a transformation of the meat industry. This clamour was 
most apparent with the introduction of shift work and year-
round employment at Seafield and Silverstream. 
The slaughterboard at Seafield was constructed, in 1985, 
around a single killing chain. Thirty-five meatworkers and 
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half a dozen meat inspectors were engaged at sequential 
work stations along the killing chain. Originally they 
worked five (and occasionally six) days of the week for eight 
hours a day. The killing chain was paced to process around 
7.6 carcases per minute or at about 3200 lamb for each 
working day. This daily 'tally' of 3200 lamb was the norm 
for a killing chain in the industry. It determined the maxi-
mum level of throughput at Seafield for the killing seasons 
of 1985, 1986, and 1987. This level of processing used no 
more than a few percent of all available stock in the South 
Island. 
In 1988 the processing capacity at Seafield were increased 
by the move to shift work and to year-round employment. 
To do so Fortex secured an enterprise agreement with the 
Canterbury-Westland branch of the meatworkers ' union. 
This agreement was subsequently extended to the Southland-
Otago branch of the meatworkers ' union and applied to the 
firm 's second plant (built at Silverstream along the same 
lines as Seafield). 
The plants at Sea field and Silverstream operated across four 
shifts. Each shift worked three days a week for eleven hours 
a day. Rostering on the shifts was determined by the union 
principle of seniority. Workers with the longest seniority 
were rostered to the first shift. Those with the least seniority 
were rostered to the fourth shift. 
The first shift worked on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday 
from 6.00 am until 5.00 pm. The second shift worked the 
same days but from 6.00 pm until 5.00 am. The third shift 
worked on Thursday, Friday and Saturday from 6.00 am 
until5.00 pm. The fourth shift also worked the second half 
of the week but from 6.00 pm until 5.00 am. 
In addition the employees at Seafield and Silverstream were 
also guaranteed a minimum number of weeks of continuous 
year-round employment. The first and second shifts were 
guaranteed all year employment. The third shift was guar-
anteed 33 weeks of work a year. The fourth shift was 
guaranteed 20 weeks. 
The agreement reached over shift work and year-round 
employment allowed Fortex to greatly expand its capacity to 
process and further process lamb. Seafield, and subse-
quently Silverstream, became capable of processing and 
further processing over 60,000 lamb a week. As a result, 
Fortex became a major buyer and processor of stock in the 
South Island and it did so at a fraction of the fixed capital 
outlays of its competitors. 
The agreement was significant to the meat industry. The 
adoption of shift work and year-round employment at Seafield 
and Silverstream broke with the norms of the industry and, 
in particular, with the traditional emphasis on day work and 
seasonal patterns of employment. 
The agreement at Fortex, secured in terms of enterprise 
bargaining as laid out in the Labour Relations Act ( 1987), 
was heralded by Mike Moore, then Prime Minister and 
Minister for Trade, as a new beginning for the meat industry 
249 
and for industrial relations in New Zealand. Further, the 
combination of increased employment (through shifts) with 
year-round employment at Seafield and Silverstream did 
much (especially in the context of otherwise worsening 
labour markets) to convince unionists at Fortex of the 
desirability of a new accommodation with management. 
Bringing in the union: TQM and team leaders 
The problems of running the lamb cutting rooms became 
pivotal to management and to the meatworkers' union at 
Fortex. Work in the cutting rooms was arranged around 
three parallel conveyor belts. Normally, but by no means 
always, carcases were cut into three large portions (called 
hinds, loins and forequarters). These portions were placed 
on one of the three conveyors. Usually, one conveyor would 
carry the hinds, another the loins , and the other the forequar-
ters. 
Around 40 workers were engaged in the cutting of hinds, 
loins and forequarters along these conveyors. The convey-
ors moved through the cutting room at about waist height 
and each was flanked by stainless steel tables . Each worker 
was assigned to a table where they did a particular set of cuts . 
Portions of meat were removed and returned to and from the 
conveyors as required. 
Work in the cutting room was extremely variable. For 
example, a forequarter could be left intact, or have neck 
chops removed, or have the shank removed, or both, or be 
completely de-boned and rolled. There were a variety of 
ways of removing neck chops and shank and even more 
ways of further cutting these portions. On the tables flanking 
the other conveyor belts the processing of hinds and loins 
offered an even greater complexity. 
Work in the cutting room required considerable dexterity 
and attention to detail. For example, one customer might 
require that a rack of lamb be frenched to the depth of 15 
millimetres, while another might demand an exposure of 25 
millimetres. 
It is important to note that Fortex had instituted a form of 
Total Quality Management (or TQM) in the late 1980s. It 
did so mainly as a response to the high rates of rejected 
output (called re-work) in the lamb cutting rooms. This 
TQM initiative relied on worker-based data collection and 
self-reporting. Like most variants ofTQM it was supposed 
to engender team work. But it met with little success . It was 
not until the later re-jigging of the payment system that 
genuine practices of team working began to impact the 
cutting room. 
In general there were three interrelated problems in the 
cutting room: high rates of re-work, inadequacies of the 
payment system, and dilemmas in supervision. 
Firstly re-work: Because Fortex entered into contracts with 
its customers which specified the exact configuration of 
portions of meat any error in executing the requisite cuts 
always jeopardised sales. At best orders that were found to 
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have been 'cut out of spec' required re-work. In 1989 and 
1990 re-work cost Fortex several hundred thousand dollars. 
Re-work was a cost borne both by the firm and by workers 
(in the formoflost wages). Thus re-workboredirectlyon the 
payment system and vice versa. Initially workers in the 
cutting rooms were paid on the basis of hourly and piece 
rates. This payment system rewarded the total number of 
carcases further processed by each shift. Like most piece 
rates used in the industry the rewards for doing the work 
were calculated on a pool basis. The pool included the entire 
shift. That is, the shift was paid an amount which was 
divided equally among the workers. 
The initial payment system created the incentive for workers 
to force through as much work a possible. But, while the use 
of piece rates in the cutting room facilitated the desired 
quantities of work it became apparent that it did so at the 
expense of the quality of work. Insofar as deficiencies in the 
latter required re-work which then reduced the subsequent 
earnings of workers this was a problem shared by manage-
ment and the union at Fortex. 
The most senior union official at one of the Fortex plants put 
it this way: 
We can ' t screw the boss for more money if he is not 
making more money. Its no good screwing the boss and 
putting him under. In order for us to get more money out 
of the boss he has got to be making more money. And the 
way he will make more money is if we are productive and 
fully employ our work skills to produce a quality prod-
uct. (interview with union official). 
The response to the problem of re-work was to modify the 
payment system by the inclusion of a 'degree of difficulty ' 
(called the D of D) into the piece rates. The degree of 
difficulty reflected how troublesome it was estimated to be 
for the workforce in the cutting room to fill customers' 
orders. Different types of cuts were bracketed together in 
terms of the degree of difficulty. In effect each degree of 
difficulty generated its own piece rate. 
The introduction of the degree of difficulty was an outstand-
ing success. It facilitated a slowing and greater precision in 
the execution of work. Following its introduction the levels 
of re-work dropped and by 1993 were almost nonexistent at 
Seafield and Silverstream. 
The overall effect was something like a fusion of interests 
between the production workers in the cutting room and 
management. This reconciliation of interests became the 
basis of further innovation by which management and the 
union attempted to eliminate all non-productive elements of 
the cutting room. In particular, the existing TQM initiative 
was rejuvenated. It subsequently highlighted inefficiencies 
and down times in the cutting rooms which management and 
the union then moved to eliminate. 
This initiative eventually resulted in the adoption of team 
work in which union sponsored team leaders effectively 
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marginalised supervisors and took over the running of the 
cutting room. 
The dilemma in supervision stemmed from the variability, 
detail and the need for dexterity in work in the cutting room. 
As a number of commentators have noticed it is difficult to 
'supervise in' quality in such circumstances. Instead, what 
can be observed is a re-flowering of some craft forms of 
control. In the lamb cutting rooms at Fortex this dynamic 
entailed team leaders taking a central role in the allocation of 
particular workers to particular jobs. 
The allocation and re-allocation of workers to jobs was a 
constant feature of further cutting. As a fatigued supervisor 
noted: 
We have changed specification ten times in two hours 
and gone from one cut to something else completely 
different in 49 carcases. Stopped, cut another 40 here, cut 
another 30 there. Which means it is a mass of organisa-
tional change . . . You might go from a very labour 
intensive cut, from a heavy grade carcass, where you 
need every one on line. All doing short loins, rumps and 
frenched racks . Then going to a YL carcass [a light 
carcass] which might be a split fore loin and a leg. Which 
means [instead of] the 30 people you need there, sud-
denly you need only a dozen. So [laughs] it can change 
quite dramatically from needing a lot of people to need-
ing very few. (interview with supervisor). 
A transfer in responsibility for running the lamb cutting 
rooms was achieved through the introduction of three or four 
team leaders into each shift. A senior unionist at Fortex 
described the rationale for the team leaders. 
We ao into the room this morning, the team leader and t> 
myself, and we audit that room. We audit everything 
everyone does. You get reasonably astute at being able 
to see what is wrong, what is not going right, what is 
costing money. Because it costs us [workers] money , as 
well as costing the company profits ... You have got to 
realise that in the cutting room, if production is down, it 
stops or there are blow-outs, it costs about $7,000 a 
minute. 
Q: In lost wages? 
No. In lost revenue to the company. (interview with 
union official). 
In summing up this section I wish to reiterate that Fortex 
pursued an integration of further processing and niche mar-
keting which heavily emphasised meeting the exact specifi-
catio ns of customers. I have already noted that this orienta-
tion was bolstered by the integration of the union with 
Fortex's marketing strategy . 
As one of the unionists noted this new realism on the part of 
the union at Fortex was driven by self interest: 
... if you don't perform there is someone else out there 
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who will. Fortex led the way in quality. They led the way 
in niche marketing. The others are catching up a little. 
We have got to sprint again now and get back out in front. 
(interview with union official). 
Unfortunately for Fortex, farmers were much less accom-
modating. Their assessment of self-interest ran counte~ to 
efforts aimed at integrating them with Fortex' s marketmg 
strategy (Yerex, 1992). 
Attempts to extend contracts and TQM to farm-
ers 
The demands of further processing and niche marketing at 
Fortex also shaped the stock procurement activities of the 
finn. In this regard it could be said that Fortex wished to 
impose the sorts of disciplines on fanners that are common-
place through-out the rest of the world (Sanderson, 19_86!, 
however it must be remembered that these sorts of diSCI-
plines are not really found in the meat industry in New 
Zealand (Curtis, 1996). 
It could be argued (while borrowing from Piore and Sabel) 
that the more successful Fortex was in approximating an 
ideal of 'bespoke manufacture' the more precise it needed to 
be in buying the type of stock that was best suited for further 
processing (Rainnie, 1991). 
The new conception of supply reflected the imperatives for 
precision and quality in further processing. It reflected the 
existence of constraints on further cutting which resulted in 
specific orders needing the dis-assembly of specific types of 
stock. Fortex (and its customers) favoured lamb and, in 
particular, lamb with a heavy and lean confirmation. 
As a long serving production manager at Fortex put it: 
Fortex processes only lambs ... We favour heavy lamb, 
up to four grades of weight over the Meat Board' s 
schedule. This is because heavy lambs are the most cost 
effective for further processing. The Meat Board and 
companies have traditionally favoured light weight lambs. 
(interview with manager). 
This was the rub: Heavy lamb may be the most cost effective 
for further processing, but they are probably the least cost 
effective for farmers (Sheppard, 1982; Yerex, 1992). 
Farming for heavy lamb requires longer and more intensive 
grazing, reduced carrying capacity for farmland, smaller 
flocks, significantly greater labour inputs and greater expo-
sure by farmers to risks. Consequently, heavy lamb are 
relatively scarce throughout the killing season and inevita-
bly command premium prices. Furthermore, the decision by 
Fortex to expand and operate Seafield and Silverstream on 
a year-round basis put it at odds with the seasonal norms of 
farming and processing in the industry. 
The majority of plants that process sheep and lamb in New 
Zealand are very seasonal operations (Evans, 1985). This is 
more so the greater is the focus on processing lamb. Nor-
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mally plants close down their operations during the winter 
months when farmers do not offer stock for slaughter. 
It could be argued that by expanding its operation into the 
winter months Fortex signalled that it wished to break with 
the rhythm of seasonality in favour of a rhythm of bespoke 
manufacture (Austrin and Curtis, 1992, 1993). However an 
unintended consequence was that Fortex was hard pressed to 
supply its plants with heavy lamb. Indeed, other classes of 
lamb, and hoggets and ewes were bought at times. 
Fortex tried to resolve its problems in securing supply by the 
use of contracts and by extending its TQM initiative to 
farmers. With regards to the latter, the union at Fortex 
played a very important practical and symbolic role. On the 
one hand, the workforce in the stockyards, slaughterboard 
and cutting rooms collected a mass of data on the quality of 
stock and meat which, because of the use of itemised 
barcoding, was traceable back to individual farmers. On the 
other hand, the most senior union officials at Fortex accom-
panied senior management on various 'Road Shows' to 
exhort farmers and others to support the attempts in adding-
value at Fortex. 
Thus, the integration of the union with the Fortex Way meant 
it stood alongside the firm in ground breaking efforts to 
discipline farmer-suppliers. This was in stark contrast to the 
traditional calls by farmers for the managers to discipline 
their unruly meatworkers. What is most important is that 
Fortex wished to abandon any reliance on the transitory 
deals for stock made at the farm -gate. Instead the preferred 
sourcing strategy at Fortex was through individual contract-
ing for supply. The main consequence of the failure of such 
contracting was that Fortex faced recurring difficulties in 
obtaining sufficient numbers of the right stock at the right 
time for the right price. 
The vulnerability of Fortex 
Throughout the 1990s there was a gradual increase in the 
numbers of heavy lamb produced in the South Island and 
spread in the months in which stock was obtainable, these 
developments actually benefited Fortex very little. In par-
ticular. Fortex was unable to develop any deals with farmers 
that gave it exclusive, or even preferential, access to their 
stock. In other words, the firm 's share of the total numbers 
of stock made available for slaughter remained largely a 
function of the price it was willing to pay at the farm-gate, 
and this price was made in competition with two very large 
farmers' co-operatives (Alliance and PPCS). 
Furthermore, Fortex had formalised (by its agreement with 
the union) a year round commitment to processing and 
buying stock. Its larger competitors remained more seasonal 
operators. This gave the farmers ' co-operatives an edge in 
the price war for stock. The strategy adopted by Alliance and 
PPCS was to drive up the price of stock in the spring and 
autumn months, when they were respectively up-scaling and 
down-scaling their buying of stock. High prices for stock at 
these times had only a marginal impact on Alliance and 
PPCS, but was very significant to the operation at Fortex. 
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In addition the workforce at Fortex enjoyed comparatively 
good wages and conditions. This premium was an important 
component of the enterprise agreement first secured at 
Fortex in 1988. However Alliance and PPCS pursued a very 
different IR strategy which, in the wake of the Employment 
Contracts Act, saw cuts in wages and conditions. 
The combination of intense pressure in markets for stock as 
well as the erosion of any advantage in processing costs was 
to be ruinous for Fortex. On the one hand, the firm became 
less able to sell its finished product. On the other hand, it was 
unable to secure sufficient raw materials. 
Conclusion 
This paper has tried to show how the integration of hot 
boning and niche marketing at Fortex was a highly complex 
and problematic undertaking that required the successful 
mediation of relationships with meatworkers and with farm-
ers. 
In this regard and in conclusion. I will let two of the main 
actors at Fortex, Peter Binnie the secretary of the union at 
Seafield and Graeme Thompson explain the demise of the 
firm. Both identify the subordination of what went on inside 
the plants to the negative response of actors (mainly farmers) 
outside them. 
First the unionist: 
There is a flip side to every coin and for us the bright side 
would have to be the fairly advanced stage we had got to 
with the TQM and ISO 9002 philosophy. It would be 
quite wrong to say that every single person had totally 
accepted these principles, yes there were some rough 
edges that needed to be fine-tuned. It is remarkable how 
many people who have found employment in other meat 
processing plants, and indeed in other walks of life have 
discovered that the lessons learned at Seafield have 
become so much a part of them. It is only now that many 
realise the significance of the 'culture' of doing it right 
and being responsible for your own patch... I am fully 
confident that if we had a chance the Fortex workforce 
would have shown the meat industry what a totally 
integrated team-work environment could achieve ... The 
workforce was the richest asset Fortex had, all of us 
whether process worker or salaried person should be 
proud of their achievement- no one can take that away 
from us. (Binnie, 1994).2 
Graeme Thompson, the managing director, echoed the state-
ments of the head of the union at Sea field. Likewise for him 
the demise of the firm, was undoubtedly the result of the 
short-sighted actions of external players and, most centrally, 
of farmers. 
The Meat Industry is a hard unforgiving business and is 
highly competitive as companies have endeavoured to 
out manoeuvre each other in a scramble for an increas-
ingly scarce raw material resource [that is, stock]. More 
than 20 companies have met financial demise in the last 
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15 years as a direct result of pressures inherent in the 
Industry. 
Fortex Group set out to make changes to the way 
sheepmeat is processed and marketed from New Zea-
land. We were successful in introducing many new 
methods which included work practices, and processing 
and marketing techniques. Our meat products were 
recognised as being the benchmark for all others to aspire 
to. There has been no argument put forward at any stage 
suggesting that Fortex was not on the right track. 
We were simply not given the time for Fortex to reach 
commercial maturity in order that full benefit could be 
gained from the many initiatives taken." (Thompson, 
1994).3 
Future research 
Work and industrial relations are typically studied in isola-
tion from the institutional environment (Fine, 1996) in 
which they are embedded. Thus, in the case of the meat 
industry the factory and the farm are constituted as separate 
fields. However there is much to be gained from collapsing 
these arbitrary distinctions and forms of network analysis 
offer a useful way of undertaking research. 
Notes 
1. Thompson was cited in O'Brien, P, Fortex report 
makes impressive reading National Business Review, 41 
12190 
2. Binnie expressed this opinion in 'Good Morning', 
Hampstead Resource Centre Newsletter, 7/6/94. 
3. Statement of Graeme Thompson, Managing Director of 
Fortex Group (In Receivership and in Liquidation). 4119/94. 
References 
Austrin, T. and Curtis, B. M. 1992 The Politics of Just-In-
Time Systems: The Case of Meat Processing 
in New Zealand Tenth International Labour 
Process Conference, l-3 April , Birmingham. 
Austrin, T. and Curtis, B. M. 1993 The Fortex Way: 
Accountability and Co-operation Institute 
for Science, Research and Development, 
Christchurch. 
Curtis, B. M. 1992 Product Markets and Labour Markets: 
The Paradox of Flexibility in the Export Meat 
Industry Morrison, P (ed) Labour Employ-
ment and Work in New Zealand: Proceedings 
of the Fifth Conference, November 12 & 13, 
Department of Geography, Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington, Wellington. 
Curtis, B. M. 1996 Producers, Processors and Markets: A 
Study of the Export Meat Industry in New 
Zealand A Thesis Submitted for the Degree 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1996 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology, Uni-
versity of Canterbury. 
Edwards, P. K. 1986 Conflict at Work Basil Blackwood, 
Oxford. 
Evans, R. 1985 Cost Competitiveness in Export Meat 
Processing Meat Industry Council, Welling-
ton. 
Fine, G. A. 1996 Kitchens: the culture of restaurant work 
Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Font, M. A. 1990 Export Agriculture and Development 
Path: Independent Farming in Comparative 
Perspective Jour!Ull of Historical Sociology 
3, 4: 329-361. 
Grabner, G. 1993, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeco-
nomics of Industrial Networks Routledge, 
New York. 
Perry, M, Davidson, C and Hill, R. 1995 Reform at Work: 
Workplace Change and the New Industrial 
Order Longman Paul, Auckland. 
Piore, M and Sabel, C. 1984 The Second Industrial Divide 
New York, Basic Books. 
Portz, J, 1991 Economic Governance and the American 
Meatpacking Industry , Campbell, J, 
Hollingsworth, J and Lindberg, L (eds) Gov-
ernance of the American Economy Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Rainnie,A. 1991 J-I-T, Sub-contracting and the Small Firm 
WorkEmploymentandSociety 5,3:353-375 . 
Salais, R. and Storper, M . 1992 The Four Worlds of 
Contemporary Industry Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 16: 169-193. 
Sanderson, S. E. 1986 The Emergence of the 'World Steer': 
Internationalization and Foreign Domination 
in Latin American Cattle Production, Twillis, 
F and Hollist, W (eds) Food, the State, and 
International Political Economy University 
of Nebraska Press, London. 
Sbeppard. R. L. 1982Seasonality in the New Zealand Meat 
Processing Industry Agricultural Economics 
Research Unit, Lincoln College. 
Yerex, D. 1992 The Farming Fiasco GP Publications, Wel-
lington. 
Author 
Bruce Curtis is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Canterbury, Private Bag 400, 
Christchurch. 
253 
